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CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE*
JOSEi'rt

G.

CooK**

The past three years have witnessed some significant developments
in the scope of protection of the fourth amendment. I would like to
discuss what seem to me to be four particularly noteworthy Supreme
Court decisions of recent vintage in terms of their immediate impact,
in terms of the unanswered questions they have raised, and in terms
of their longer range influence on the development of fourth amendment conceptualization.
The first decision I would call to your attention is the 1967 decision,
Katz v. United States.' The Katz case is primarily understood to be a
case involving electronic eavesdi opping, but its implications extend far
beyond that particular aspect of fourth amendment protection. Katz
was a bookie, engaged in his profession in a public telephone booth.
Unbeknown to hini at the time, federal agents had placed an electronic
bug in the phone booth-not on the telephone line but simply in the
booth-the effect of which was to pick hf) his half of the conversations.
Recordings of these conversations were subsequently introduced against
him in a federal prosecution.
The United States Supreme Cort held that the use of this evidence
in his trial was a violation of the fourth amendment with the now
famous statement, -[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.'' = The Court said, "What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.''a In
other words, the Katz case establishes a notion of reasonable expectations
of privacy as a substantive part of the fourth amendment protection.
It is true that the notion of the right of privacy is not an entirely
new concept in regard to the foutrth or fifth amendment. As a matter
of fact, as early as 1886, in Boyd v. United States, there is langtiage in
Supreme Court opinions that recognizes that the fourth amendment is
designed to protect lprivacy. Until the Katz decision, however, this was
at the Southeastern Trial Lawyers Institute, held
of Tennessee College of Law, April 17, 1970.
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primarily window dressing. Under Ka-tz the notion of a right of privacy
in a restricted sense is now part and parcel of the fourth amendment,
and the impact of the Katz decision thus goes beyond the problems of
electronic eavesdropping.
Cases are beginning to appear in the lower courts in which these
possibilities are being explored. For example, the Supreme Court of
California in a rather recent decision, People v. Edwards,:' was concerned
with the situation in which officers received a tip from the defendant's
neighbor-not of such reliability or particularity to constitute probable
cause-that the defendant had some rnarijuana in his possession. The
neighbor had seen it on the defendant's back porch. The police went
to the defendant's home, did not find him there, entered his back yard
and looked inside the garbage can. There the) found a discarded bag
with a few loose remnants of marijuana. This evidence was introduced
against him at his trial for possession. The issue was raised on appeal
as to whether the search and seizure violated the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court of California in approaching this case was not at
all directly concerned with the fact that there had been a trespass on
the defendant's property. which would have been a first consideration
in pre-Katz analysis. Rather, the decision of the case turned simply on
the question of whether one has a right of privacy in his garbage can
that is protected against invasion by officers of the state. The court
became very reflective about this matter and ultimately concluded that
we all have skeletons in our garbage cans that we would prefer our
neighbors not discussing over tea, and that there is, in fact, good reason
for extending the constitutional protection to such an invasion.
My point is not whether the Edwa-rds case is right or wrong or
whether it is a proper application of Katz. 1 do not know. As a matter
of fact, because of the very open-ended nature of Katz, we are getting
a proliferation of decisions that cannot all be reconciled; that is to be
expected. The point is that in dealing with unique problems such as
this, whether they involve electronic eavesdropping or anything else,
Katz now provides an overview of the type of analysis that is necessary
to determine if a fourth amendment right has been infringed.
A second d&cision that seems to rue of predominant significance in
the past several years is the fainrotis stop-and-frisk case, Terry v. Ohio,'!
decided in 1968. Briefly reviewing the facts in Terry: a plaiu-clothes
officer observed Terry and two companions standing before a store

5. 80 Cal. Rp. 633 (1969).
6. 392 U.S. I (1968).
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front, walking back and forth, occasionally looking in and conversing.
Ihe officer, based onl his experience, was convinced that these three
individuals were planning a robbery. After his observations had continued for some period of time, the officer decided to approach the
individuals and inquire as to what they were ip to. He did so and
received a res)onse aniotinting to nothing more than aI mumble, whereupon lhe wheeled Terry arou1nd between himself and the other two
suispects, patted down Terry's clothing and came upon what he took
to be a wealpon, reached inside his pocket. and ultinvately retrieved a
pistol. Terry was convicted of' carrying a concealed weapon.
There
was no siggest ion ltmade by the prosecution it this case that there was
probable cause, as traditionally understood, for this intervention by
the officer in the activities of these three men. Tlhe Supreme Court,
however, said that did not make any difference. The conduct of the
officer under the facts wits entirely reasonable-the stopping and inquiring of the individuas under these slspicious circumstances could be
justified, and the frisk which followed wis ,Isuitable means of selfprotection oil the part of the officer.
The Terry case does this: it recognizes that there is not one single
staindard of' probalble cause, in tetrms of knowledoe to believe a criute
has been committed, that would justify am interference with the free(loni of a individtal. Ther-e is a lowet stiUnlardv-,,on may Call it a
fluctuating standard-of l)robal)le catise. Or, if sou prefer you lan
lust avoid using the teim probable catise-emplov it only in the context
of artest-and say that if the faIts known to the officer reach a certain
level of suspicion, so that it can l)e said that an insesti.,ition (f what is
going on is rieasonably justified. then an intervention of this type is
constitutionally legiti iate. TIhat does not meani a fortiori that he can
cari out a frisk. There is a need for a further level of sUspicion-that
the officer has reasoit to believe that he is in danger of a possible assault
through the use of t weapon. If that higher level is present, then the
ftisk also will be justified. It both instances, howeer, SlISl)iCiou is hot
aj)t to ieach the level o' piol;ablc iise.
\ numbler of questions aiti raised as a tesilt of Torry v. Ohio that
hste not set been answered. Beat in iniid that all we have now is one
case in which we have been told that here there was adequate suspi(ciol
to stop and adequate suspiion to frisk. \Ve do not have any clear-ctt
test; we really cannot expleclt to get I very clear-cut test anis Imore than
we cai expect to get a ( leat- (ut leliiteaition of what we mean b)y iprobable
cause. Bs tile ver s'natiuie of the atctivitv it tequiies an acc(lliilatioill
of fact situations so that we (an glean one group of cases in which ade(luate suspicion was ])reseit Iom another giroup in which it was iot.
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Outside that difficult factual problem, which I think we can never
completely overcome, suppose an officer approaches an individual under
what are considered suspicious circumstances, asks him to stop, and the
individual does not stop. Does the officer at that point have the authority to forcibly stop him to investigate his activities? justices Harlan and
White in concurring opinions in the Terry case say, unequivocally, yes.
It can well be argued that unless the officer possesses that atthority
then the power to stop and frisk becomes rather empty. On the other
hand, it can be said that if the officer does have the authority to forcibly
stop the individual and detain him against his will, how does this differ
from an arrest? The point of Terry v. Ohio is to distinguish the circumstances in which you can sto0) without probable cause frtom situations
in which you can arrest with probable cause.
Another approach you can take to this problem is to say that if the
suspect fails to cooperate with the officer this provides the officer with
additional facts which help to raise his level of suspicion to probable
cause and thereby justify an arrest. There are numerous cases which
indicate that the reaction of the suspect upon the approach of the officer
is a factor that can be considered in determining whether probable cause
exists. If this is true, if the failure to stop changes the situation to one
of probable cause, then in effect we have said that an individual has no
option. He cither can voluntarily stop in response to question, or, if
he does not stop, he is subject to being forcibly stopped and at that
point being arrested. Probably the court will hold that the officer can
forcibly stop the individual under the circumstances which justify stopping and frisking.
Beat in mind that the Terry case is concerned with field investigations. It does not in anv way involve the possibility of stopping individuals and taking them to the station house and perhaps carrying out
an interrogation process. This significant limitation. at least today,
of where Terr, applies was made rather clear by the very recent decision,
Morales v. New York, 7 ini which the New York courts had used Terry
to justify detaining I suspect fot custodial questioning on less than probable cause. The United States Supreme Court noted that what the New
York court was doing here went beyond the holding in Terry. It was
rather clear from the opinion, it seetis to tte, that the court was very
nervous about this case and did not want to have to get into it if it
did not have to, and it avoided deciding the issue by remanding the
case to the New York courts with the hope that on reconsideration and a
7. 396 U .S. 102

(1969).
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further factutal determination they would be able to find that there
was probable cause to arrest Morales at the time they took him into the
police station. The question remains open, but from the Morales case
we get the message that if custodial interrogation can be justified under
the Terry decision, it is clearly an extension of Terry, and we have not
gone that far yet.
As to a second question raised by the Terry case, if the officer does
forcibly stop the individual, or if he stops of his own free will, is he
under alny legal obligation to respond to any questions the officer asks
him? Again, it might be suiggestedl that if the individual fails to provide any explanation for his activities then the officer can think that
his suspicions are therefore confirmed and he has probable cause to
arrest.
Here the problem becomes a little more difficult, however,
because we are up against the clear statement of the Supreme Court ill
Escobedos and Miranda" that under the fifth amendment an individual
has an absolute right to remain silent. If he chooses to exercise that
right and then we use the exercising of the right to establish probable
cause for arrest, we are doing what the court would call penalizing the
individual for exercising his constitutional right, and there are any
number of decisions that frown upon that, such as SiMMos v. Un ite'd
States,", involving a conflict of fourth and fifth amendment rights;
United States v. Jackson," concerning the right to trial by jutry; and
North Carolina v. Pearce,' -' holding that an individual usually cannot
receive greater punishment on retrial if he successfully appeals his conviction.
While these are open questions under Terry v. Ohio,- a that case is
clearly a ratification of the power of police to catrry olt limited forms
of detention and, where appropriate, incidental frisks to search for possible weapons. In that sense, it does nothing more than affirm what has
been true at common law. and is not that significant in terms of creating
new constitutional doctrine. It does, however, serve a very useftil )ttrpose, I think, in giving a clear constitutional legitiluization to those activities.
The third decision of p~redominant sign ificale is the 1969 decision
in Chimel v. California.'4 It seems to me that this is one of the ntost
8. Escobedo
9. Miranda
10. 390 U.S.
11. 390 U.S.
12. 395 U.S.
13. 392 U.S.
14. 395 t i.S.

v. Illinois, 378 t'.S.178 (1964).
v. Arizona, 384 1.S. 436 (1966).
377 (1968).
570 (1968).
711 (1969).
1 (1968).
752 (1969).
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important Su)rene Court decisions in the area of fourth amiendment
protections that has come down illmany years.
Unquestionably, tile' biggest "wild card" law enforcement officers
have had in in vestigating offenses illrecent years has been tile anuthortv
to catrrly outt I waitalitless sellch incident to an aTest, whether the aTest
be with or without a warrant. Severe limitations are placed o a policeman if he searches with ;I warrant, illthat he must establish probable
cause that specifically entmerated itenis are present illa specificalI
described place. That is simply what the fouttrth tmendmnent says: itis
xery p/articttlmr about the matter. On the other hand, if aI search is
catried out incident to an arrest, the officer has been free to seize anything ill the atea illwhich the arrest occurs that is relevant to the subject
matter of' the arrest. The result of this power, which had been cottinuallx ratified and. illfact, expanded by the Sitpreme Court illrecent
years, was that if ai arrest was made illa home. for example. the police
were pretty well free to search the entire premises and look for anyithing
which 1i,h6igtbe reasonably relevant to the subiect of the artest. If they
ctme upon
ntrelaied contraband or instrumentalities of crinic, tile,
could seize that as well.
InI Chimcl the cottrt severely restricted the reasonableness of a search
witlhot a warrant incident to .anl arrest. holding that the permissible
search covered two possibilities: (I) a searic of the person arrested for
wealpons and evidence which lie might conceal oi- destroy, and (2) a
search of tile Immediate area which the arrestee might reach.
Any
search extetding beyoid those litlits -wotud re q uire a warrant. It seems
to tile, and this lias been )r-etty well confirmed b\ discussions I have
had with people illlaxw enforcement. tile impalct of (himl is far more
potent than the impact of Miranda, for example, oi the practical workada x problems of law enforcement.
Unquestionabl\. there are many
more instances in whiih evidence seized incident to an arrest is irt od1u1ed illa triminal trial than is a,confession. and this decision has tile
effect of severely I ititilg tile iotential scope of warrantless searches.
I think we can expect that gaps and exceptions are going to be ver
itxettixelx applied to the Chimcl decision. \e ate ;,tead getting some
indication of thiis itt dcc isions of lower cottrts. For example, in Scoil v.
.Stalrl.;
a
xiyland tplellate court recently interpreted "witlin reach"
to Ieat "within lige." Iti this manner. the courts are rapidly softeniltg the impact of' Chilcl and loosenittg its tathet strong strictures oi
solclies im ident to arrest.
15. 2.56 A.2d 38-

(Nid. App. 1969).
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The fourth decision is a case that I think generally has been overlooked in terms of its implications on the development of the fourth
amendment, and I think those implications are somewhat disturbing.
The case I ani referring to is Davis v. Mississippi,'; also a 1969 decision.
Concededly, the immediate holding in the Davis case is really not very
significant. A victim of a rape identified her assailant as "a Negro
youth,- nothing tmore. On the basis of that description the police put
out a dragnet and brought in every Negro youth the\, could find-some
fi fty to seventy-five-in the given area, fingerprinted them all, and interrogated most of thm.
-This practice went on for several days, in the
process of which Davis, the defendant in this case, was identif'ied by
fingerprints as being the perpetrator of tihe offense. These fingerprints
were introduced in evidence at his iriail.
The United States Supreme
Court, not surprisingly. reversed the conviction.
We had here what
was clearly anl arrest without probatble cause. We had fingerprints
which were clearly the fiu its of that illegal arrest, and in light of precedents stretching back to Sihvrthornuc Litinber Company'- there was no
question but that evidence that was the fruit of an illegal arrest could
not be intr-oluced at trial.
The significant aspect of )avis, however, is not in the decision of the
case; it is in the dictum in which the cotrt said that it was conceivable
that had the police in this case first obtained a warrant fot tihe putpose
of doing precisely what they did-that is. going out and bringing in
everybody who met this general descri ption and fingerprinti ng themit was quite conceivable that this could satisfy lourth amendient standairds.
In reaching that conclusion tilex (ited the case of Camara v. Al oni'iPal Court.1'
I will digress a little to tell xou somethitg about the
Camara case, which is actually unrelated but which helps us to understand what they were talking about. Camara and its companion case,
See 71.City of Sealtle," involved municipal inspectors who were checking
residences and commerial buildings to enlorce munici al ordinaceshealth, saflety, fiire regitlations and the like. A question was ra isedi as to
whether these types of inspe(tions (ooild be caried out without the use
of' a warrant, since warants werc never obtained. Ol behlll of the
city it was argutied ihat it was impossible to establish probable cause to

16. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).

17. Silvertho-ne Lumbler Co. \. t nitud States. '251 1 .S.385 (1920O).
18. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
19. 387 U.S. 5-t (196j).
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carry out these inspections because of their very nature. They were of a
preventive design, and the only way the ordinances could effectively
be enforced was by blanket inspections of all the buildings within a
given area. The court considered the problem and concluded that the
municbpalities were quite incorrect in believing that no fourth amendment problem was in issue. Without consent given by the occupant,
they held, the authorities would have to obtain warrants. But, they
went on, in this sort of case it would not be necessary to have probable
cause-as it is traditionally understood. To carry out a search one need
not establish the probability of the commission of any offense. Rather,
if the standard set out in the municipal ordinance was simply stated,
and a reasonable method of carrying out an inspection to enforce that
ordinance offered, a warrant could be obtained. 1he dissenting justices
thought that this, in effect, created paper warrants by introducing a
fluctuating standard of probable cause, varying in terms of the purpose
for which a warrant was sought.
Returning to our present concern, Davis v. Mississippi cites Camara
and suggests that a warrant might be obtainable simply for the purpose
of taking fingerprints. The rationale appears to be that this type of
interference with individual freedotn is so minor that nobody could
really object to it and, therefore, for this very limited purpose there is
nothing wrong with interfering with the freedom of an entire class
of people.
The Davis case opens u ) the possibility for an entirely new type of
exercise of police authority-a temporary detention for the purpose of
identification. There has recently been introduced in the United States
Congress Senate Bill No. 2997, entitled "Detention for Obtaining Evidence of Identifying Physical Characteristics.'
Pursuant to the dictum
in the Davis case, this bill allows warrants to be issued for temporary
detentions for the obtaining of certain evidence of physical characteristics. The germane language of the proposal reads as follows: "As used
in this section. 'identifying physical characteristics' includes but is not
limited to, the fingerprint, palnprints, footprints, measurements, handwriting, handprinting, sound of voice, blood samples, urine samples,
saliva samples, hair samples.The last, of course, will include pubic
hair, which is not infrequently used in rape cases for lrposes of identification.
What are the chances ol this proposal withstanding constitutional
attack? First, I think it is clear that not all of the characteristics which
are enutnerated in this bill are of equal constitutional Vulnerability.
For example, I would think that seeking progressively fingerprints,

1970]
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blood samples, urine samples and pubic hair, otne is going to run into
an increasingly difficult job convincing the court that this is a reasonable exercise of authority and (toes not inordinately interfere with the
freedom of individuals. Second, the act provides for detentions up to
five hours in duration. \Vhile in some instances this time period may
be reasonable, it certainly will not be in all cases. Any continued detention after the identification evidence has been obtained, absent the
then presence of probable cause, may be quite questionable. Third,
one cannot help but be somewhat apprehensive about the class nature
of this investigatory tool. In Davis the class was "Negro youths;" in
the next case the suspect may he "a hippie," or "a college student," or
''a college professor.'
The possibility of using this type of authorization
for the purpose of compiling a comprehensive fingerprint file of all
members of a particular group is readily apparent simply from reading
the facts in the 1)avis case itself.
Finally, it may be suggested that, in any event, Senate Bill No. 2997
is unneeded, for whatever constitutional authority officers have to carry
out such investigative practices can likely now be employed using conventional search warrant procedures. Our experience over the past
few years indicates that the constant push for additional statutory
authorization in police investigation is unnecessary. Recall that while
reat interest centered around the constitutionality of the New York
stop-and-frisk law,2 when the practice was finally approved in the Terry
case no statute was involved at all. Again, while monumental efforts
have been directed toward the drafting and passage of legislation at both
the state and federal level to permit electronic eavesdropping, the only
case in which the Supreme Court has approved a judicially authorized
eavesdrop is Osborn v. Um'led States 21 where a Nashville federal judge
approved carefully proscribed electronic surveillance without the benefit
of any particularized legislation. Finally, in reading the Davis decision
itself, while the Court suggests that the officers' purpose might have
been achieved with the use of a warrant, nowhere (toes the Court indicate
that any such wariant would requiire a pre-existing statutor authorization.
In summary, the Katz decision has provided us with a new overview conceptualization of what the fourth amendment means, and for
the foreseeable future, an\y fourth amendment case may warrant attention to the bearing of Katz. Terry v. Ohio firmly legitimizes an essential

20. N.Y. Coor CRI, . "'Roc. § 180-a.
21. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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field investigative method: peripheral questions as to the exercise of
that power remain unanswered. Chimel v. California radically changes
long-standing standards for warrantless searches and is having significant elfect on police investigative practices. I)avis v. Mississippi, while
insignificant in itself, has opened a Pandora's box to investigative detenThe fourth amendment protection is thLIus, strangely, simultions.
taneouisly expanding and contracting and will remain a most complex
aica oI constitutional adldication lor the fores eable future.

